The Law of Hybrid War by Andrew Korybko

This is basically a Cheka-approved Wikipedia of potential conflict zones. Written in 2017, it provides general updated background for inflation-driven events, eg. Kazakhstan.

The grand objective behind every Hybrid War is to disrupt multipolar transnational connective projects through externally provoked identity conflicts (ethnic, religious, regional, political, etc.) within a targeted transit state.
The third and prospectively most significant of the three infrastructure projects planned through Pakistan is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This mammoth $46 billion endeavor will give China a vital lifeline to the Indian Ocean through the Port of Gwadar and allow it to mitigate the strategic loss that its expected to suffer in Myanmar (which will described a bit later on in the research). In fact, its entirely feasible that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor could even become the basis for a Eurasian-wide
zipper that helps to bring the Eurasian Union, China, Iran, and SAARC all together. While its still far too early to say whether or not this scenario will ever fully pan out, all the present odds seem to stand to its favor, and its successful implementation would give the multipolar world its strongest leverage yet in reshaping the supercontinents geo-economic flows
When one thinks of a terrorist-driven caliphate, the last thing that probably comes to mind is a mountainous, snow-covered retreat, but this is exactly what ISIL or any likeminded group could feasibly create in Southern Kyrgyzstan if they played their cards right. It would be extremely challenging to dislodge the terrorists in such a scenario, and the danger in doing so would critically spike if it were revealed that they had access to anti-aircraft weapons. The Kyrgyz military would obviously be unsuited for such a difficult task and would have to resort to their Russian partners in the CSTO for assistance, with Moscow predictably helping through a combination of drone surveillance and air strikes just as its currently doing in Syria at the moment.
The last likely scenario under which the US could promote a third iteration of the Central Asian Spring would be as a chaos multiplier amidst an independently existing (but no less American-influenced) regional disorder. Examples of this could be a Color Revolution in any of the four examined states, an international conflict over the numerous enclaves that dot the region, and/or a successionist crisis in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and/or Uzbekistan. The point here is that while each of these ongoing scenarios are destabilizing in and of themselves, the introduction of a Greater Uzbekistan and/or Islamic jihad movement into the mix could be the critical factor that leads to the situation spiraling disastrously out of control and towards the pan-regional chaotic path that the US intends for it.
Most of the Balkans are tied to Russia through the intimate links of religious, linguistic, ethnic, and historical bonds, with the latter being most strongly epitomized through Tsar Alexander IIs liberation campaign in the region from 1877-1878. As per the latter, the geopolitical designs that Russia had at the time are exceptionally controversial and outside the focus of this analysis, but its relevance in being included in this section is in showing that the Eastern Balkans (Romania, Bulgaria) served as a bridge in physically connecting Russia to the Mideast (Turkey), which culminated in Russian forces briefly reaching the village of San Stefano just a few miles outside of Constantinople.
Keeping in line with the complementary nature of the Russian-Chinese Strategic Partnership, Russias plan is to spearhead the Balkan Stream gas pipeline (the authors geographically inclusive name for the full scope of the planned Turkish Stream project) while Chinas is to build the Balkan Silk Road high-speed rail corridor through the region. Both projects run along the north-south axis connecting the Central Balkans with Greece, thus explaining the earlier analytical importance given to this specific sub-region. The Balkan Stream is envisioned to travel underneath the Black Sea and make land in Turkeys Eastern Thrace region, before continuing through Greece, the Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Hungary. The Balkan Silk Road is planned to proceed along mostly the same coordinates, connecting the Greek port of Piraeus (one of the largest and most important in Europe) with Budapest by way of Skopje and Belgrade. Taken together, Russias expected role is to prov! ide an independent source of energy while Chinas is to do the same with trade, and theyre both supposed to greatly supplement the independent decision-making capabilities of their transit partners and guide them towards multipolarity.
The use of large-scale strategically engineered and directed human population flows as an asymmetrical weapon was formally theorized by Kelly M. Greenhill in her 2010 book about Weapons of Mass Migration: Forced Displacement, Coercion, and Foreign Policy, although its likely that her publication wasnt the first time that such a nefarious strategy was thought of.
To many, Orban defines a new generation of anti-systemic European leaders that are bravely defying the unipolar dictates of the US and the EU, but upon closer scrutiny, this is all but a carefully crafted sham (albeit with sincere convictions on Orbans part) to let the fox loose in the henhouse and undermine multipolar social movements before they ever have the chance to enact tangible change in Europe.
Nevertheless, for the time being, the China-Myanmar Pipeline Corridor is still in its early stages, and the route itself is exceptionally vulnerable to rebel attacks, despite none having happened as of yet. Additionally, the non-resource economic aspect of this corridor has yet to be actualized, leaving a lot of valuable potential still waiting to be tapped. Concerning the other project, the ASEAN Silk Road hasnt even been constructed yet and will still need a few years before its fully built and operational (if not over its entire route, than at least partially through Thailand and up to the Indian Ocean)
In reference to the previous, Eritrea does not have positive relations with Djibouti and actually fought a brief border war with its neighbor in 2008. As per UN agreement, Qatar has deployed its troops to both countries in order to mediate the conflict and has remained in the region since 2010, presenting another factor of instability vis--vis Ethiopia which will be discussed later on. To continue with the state of bilateral relations between the two coastal countries, its worthwhile to also mention that Eritrea has actually had problems with all of its neighbors, and this includes Sudan and Yemen (the latter via the Hanish Islands conflict), which together demonstrates a distinct pattern of Eritrean behavior. Therefore, the 2008 conflict with Djibouti mustnt be seen in isolation, but rather as a continuation of long-standing Eritrean policy which regularly resorts to militant means to achieve its goals. It cant be discounted that Qatar and Eritrea might conspire ! together in supporting Al Shabaab attacks inside of Djibouti in order to inflict strategic harm on Ethiopia, since not only has the Gulf state been convincingly linked to the terrorist organization, but Eritrea is actually under UNSC sanctions for allegedly aiding it in the past
Nevertheless, this might incite a counter-reaction from the Afar, which could then agitate for their own independence, unification with the Afar Region of Ethiopia (and thenceforth the destruction of the Djibouti geopolitical unit), or possibly even some form of Identity Federalism within Djibouti in order to retain the extant borders of the unwinding state. If that potentiality turns out to be the case, then the Afar would acquire the sparsely populated and landmine-infested northern reaches of the Gulf of Tadjoura while the Somali-Issas would receive the southern and more populated reaches, with the capital and ethnically mixed city of Djibouti (and all of its military facilities) being a separate political unit in the shade of Old Cold War-style Berlin.
In spite of Ugandas geographically limited size and status as a landlocked country, Kampala has impressively managed to exert military influence across a broad and varied continental space, stretching from the northeastern corner of the DRC (and prior, during the First Congo War, all the way up to Kinshasa), the eastern Central African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and even Somalia
Cameroon, one of the most stable and relatively prosperous countries in all of Africa. Despite being home to more than 240 separate ethno-linguistic groups, Cameroon avoided the destructive tribal violence of its continental peers owing mostly to its strong leadership and diversified economy. President Paul Biya, in office since 1982, has been instrumental in guiding the country through the post-Cold War transitional phase and imprinting a unified identity on its people
To continue speaking more about the Tuaregs themselves, several important comparisons can be made to the Kurds and Baloch. All three groups are proud of their identities and fiercely secular, and some members of their communities have a history of waging separatist conflicts that easily spill across the border. Moreover, the Tuaregs, Kurds, and Baloch are stateless in the sense that they dont have their own nation-state and instead live within larger cosmopolitan ones, which is a political fact that has recurrently been exploited by both their own communal demagogues and foreign instigators in order to incite conflict against their state of residence. The biggest difference between the Tuaregs, Kurds, and Baloch, however, is that the former are much smaller in numerical size than the other two though theyre inversely spread out across the largest area of the three
Coups were carried out in 1974, 1996, 1999, and 2010,with the most recent one interestingly occurring right after the 2007-2009 Tuareg-involved conflict and amidst a sharp deterioration of French-Nigerien relations. Its definitely possible that the French had a hand in overthrowing President Tandja after the constitutional crisis that was triggered when he took moves to run for a third time. Its also relevant that this was right around the time when China was awarded its first uranium mine in the country, which probably sent alarm bells ringing in Paris and prompted Sarkozy to take measures to indirectly deal with this and prevent the presumed pro-Chinese alignment of the Nigerien government from spiraling out of control and jeopardizing the strategic security of Frances uranium investments. The government announced that a mysterious coup plot was allegedly foiled in December 2015, but because of the dearth of details and secrecy surrounding the situation, its! unclear exactly what this could have been linked to, who might have really been behind it, or even if it was an actual threat at all in the first place and not a blown-out-of-proportion or manufactured pre-election scandal by incumbent President Issoufou (who went on to win re-election in early 2016 by an over 80% margin).